Recent research shows that variation in teacher quality
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Education Secretary Margaret Spellings recently referred to a small group of largely urban schools as "dropout factories" and did so with good reason -these schools are graduating less than 50 percent of their students. In fact, Orfield et al. (2004) show that in almost half of the high schools in the 100 largest urban school districts in the country, 12 th -grade classes are less than 50 percent of the size of 9 th -grade classes four years earlier. This "graduation rate crisis," as it has been dubbed by these authors, is of great economic significance. For example, Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) estimate that an extra year of schooling corresponds to a 12 to 16 percent increase in wages and Barrow and Rouse (2004) estimate that in 2003, high school graduates earned approximately 75 percent more than high school dropouts annually. 1 Furthermore, in addition to the costs of dropping out borne by individuals, high dropout rates are also associated with negative externalities. Lochner and Moretti (2004) estimate that a 1-percentage-point increase in high school completion among men ages 20 to 60 would save the United States $1.4
billion per year by reducing costs associated with crime.
The recent teacher-quality literature overwhelmingly indicates that differences in teacher quality have large effects on student performance measured by test scores. 2 Given this result, and that graduation outcomes are of such great economic importance, it seems natural to ask whether teacher quality affects graduation outcomes. 3 Econometrically, analyzing teacher quality in terms of graduation outcomes is complicated by the non-random assignment of students to 2 teachers. In the test-score literature, panel datasets have been exploited to remove bias generated by this non-random student-teacher matching. Specifically, test-score studies have relied on lagged measures of performance and student fixed effects to remove sorting bias. However, in the analysis of graduation outcomes these methods cannot be implemented because graduation outcomes cannot be tracked over time as can test-score outcomes. At a given point in time, a student simply drops out of school or does not.
This paper uses variation from yearly school-level staffing changes to identify teacher effects on graduation outcomes. These staffing changes represent changes in the exposure of students to teachers over time. Differences in teacher quality are shown to have non-negligible effects on graduation outcomes, even within schools, implying that improvements in teacher quality can help mitigate the graduation-rate crisis faced by many urban school districts across the country.
This finding is relevant in the debate over which types of students are more responsive to changes in teacher quality. Whereas recent research by Clotfelter et al. (2006) , based on student test-score performance, indicates that the returns to teacher quality may be higher for advantaged students, the evidence here shows that the weakest students also have much to gain from improvements in teacher quality.
I. Empirical Strategy
Students' teachers throughout high school are likely to be endogenous to their graduation outcomes. This endogeneity may manifest itself either through direct teacher selection by students within subjects, or through subject selection (i.e., choosing to take calculus) that affects teacher selection. In addition, graduation outcomes may be correlated with the assignment of students to teachers by administrators. To identify teacher effects, I exploit exogenous variation 3 in the exposure of students to teachers over time. This variation comes from yearly school-level staffing changes and is highest among math teachers, who are the focus of this study. I jointly model students' graduation outcomes with teacher selection and estimate teacher effects via maximum likelihood.
Consider the following empirical model of the student dropout decision. Let * i D denote the net benefit to student i of dropping out of high school where:
(1)
In equation (1), the vector X i includes controls for demographics, socioeconomic status, Englishlearner status, whether or not the student switched schools during high school and the initial math class taken in ninth grade for each student. The J-dimensional vector T i indicates which teachers taught student i during high school and is endogenous to the dropout outcome. Student The initial-math-course controls in equation (1) provide a measure of pre-high school performance as pre-high school performance determines initial math-course placement in high school. 4 Additionally, they capture the effects of tracking within schools. For example, if students who start high school in remedial math classes are more likely to attend remedial 4 I also considered including pre-high school test scores in the dropout specification but there was a substantial portion of the student sample that did not have test-score records for the 8 th grade. This is because I focus on underperforming schools in San Diego which tend to have the most transient student populations (see Section II). exacerbated as P(D i = 1) approaches zero or one. For a range of values consistent with the dropout rates across the schools evaluated here, Bhattacharya et al. (2006) show that a linearbased model produces biased estimates of treatment effects while a probit-based model produces unbiased estimates. Furthermore, these authors show that even if the multivariate probit is misspecified (i.e., the underlying data generating process is not multivariate normal), it still produces treatment-effect estimates that are generally less biased than the analogous linear-based specification.
My identification strategy relies on variation in the classes taught by teachers over time to capture student exposure, by cohort, to teachers. For example, consider a math teacher who teaches four classes of algebra and one class of geometry in one year. In the next year, this teacher might teach two classes of algebra and three classes of geometry. Furthermore, some teachers move in and out schools over time. Figure 1 shows four examples of variation in the proportion of the total number of student semesters taught in different subjects over time for four different teachers used in this analysis. This variation reflects changes in the exposure of students to teachers and can be used to identify teacher effects. For example, depending on what year a given student happens to take geometry, the probability of that student being taught by teacher j may change simply because teacher j teaches more (or fewer) geometry classes in that year. I define seven subject-types that math teachers teach in any given year: pre-algebra (that is, anything below algebra), algebra, geometry, advanced geometry, intermediate algebra, advanced intermediate algebra and advanced math (pre-calculus and calculus).
Given the variation in the classes taught by teachers over time, differences in the classes taken and the timing of classes taken by students create variation in student-teacher exposure.
Therefore, I use students' class schedules to instrument for teacher selection. For example, consider a student who took algebra in the 1998-1999 school year and geometry in 1999-2000. The probability of this student being taught by the different math teachers at her school will depend in part on which teachers taught algebra in 1998-1999 and geometry in 1999-2000, and what proportions of the classes in each subject that these teachers taught.
If I were to assume that students' own math-course choices are exogenous to their dropout decisions, I could instrument for teacher selection using each student's own class schedule throughout high school. For example, the math-course path algebra-geometry-geometryprecalculus, followed over a four year sequence by some student, would imply exposure to a specific set of teachers. However, the course choices made by students in high school are not exogenous to their dropout decisions. Therefore, rather than use each student's own class schedule to instrument for teacher selection, I instead use each student's entry-level math course in ninth grade to project her subsequent math-course path based on sample-wide averages (probabilistic). For example, for students who took algebra in the ninth grade at school X, I can map out the proportion who took each type of math course in subsequent years and in this way create an average math-course path for these students at school X. I create math-course paths at each school based on seven possible entry-level math courses. 8 For each student, I replace her 8 The seven math-course paths are based on the following entry-level mathematics classifications: No math, prealgebra, pre-algebra/algebra, algebra, algebra/geometry, geometry, advanced geometry. Pre-algebra/algebra and algebra/geometry indicate split years. None of the (few) students who entered high school at a level above advanced geometry failed to graduate. Therefore, these students were omitted from the analysis. Recall that students' entrylevel math classes are included directly into the dropout equation in addition to the teacher selection equations. Therefore, the instruments are just the math-course paths.
own math-course choices with the average math-course path corresponding to her entry-level math course at her school, thereby removing the endogenous decisions of individual students from the instrument sets. To avoid building the effects of the treatments (teachers) into the instruments, and to further alleviate endogeneity concerns, I exclude students' own year-cohorts when calculating the math course paths. Note that by substituting for each student's individual math-course path with the relevant sample-wide average in the instrument sets, I identify teacher effects from changes in the cohort-level exposure of students to teachers.
For teacher-selection equation j, I interact the students' projected math-course paths with indicator variables for the subject-years that teacher j teaches to complete the instrument sets.
The incorporation of teachers' teaching schedules into the instrument sets means that the teacher effects are identified from contemporaneous student-teacher exposure and will improve instrument performance. To see this, note that all of the instruments used here are based on the same underlying information about students' class schedules. For example, conditional on knowing the probability of a student taking algebra in year X, knowing the probability of her taking geometry will do little to better predict the probability of her being taught by an algebra teacher in year X. Adding additional instruments that provide little in terms of extra explanatory power can increase estimation bias (Murray, 2006) . The interaction of students' class schedules with teachers' teaching schedules provides an intuitive and systematic approach to limiting the presence of largely irrelevant instruments in the teacher selection equations.
Again, because the variation in the classes taught by teachers over time in secondary school is largest among math teachers, they are the focus of this analysis. In addition to the mechanical appeal of focusing on math teachers, school administrators and popular media have argued that math is a decisive subject for students' graduation outcomes (Helfand, 2006) . For example, speaking about algebra in 2006, Los Angeles schools Supt. Roy Romer was quoted as saying "It triggers dropouts more than any single subject." However, other teachers may also influence graduation outcomes. One concern with my approach is that if there is tracking, exposure to an above-average math teacher may also imply exposure to an above-average English teacher, an above-average history teacher, and so on. In addition to controlling for students' initial math courses in the 9 th grade to capture the effects of tracking on dropout outcomes more generally, my identification strategy further mitigates this issue by relying on the by-cohort exposure of students to teachers rather than the individual-level exposure of students to teachers. Thus, the estimated teacher effects will not be confounded by the (potentially high) correlation of teacher quality across subjects within students. 9 Another possible concern with my analysis is that some teachers might only teach students at certain grade levels, which could create a mechanical relationship between teacher selection and dropouts. First, this concern is somewhat alleviated by the fact that math is not a grade-level specific subject in secondary school. For example, the typical algebra class will have students in all grade levels. 10 More importantly, the instruments ensure that the exposure from which the teacher effects are identified is not grade-level specific. To see this, consider a teacher, teacher
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A, who taught algebra at school X in year Y. Even if all of the students taught by teacher A happened to be in the 9 th grade, the instruments will identify teacher A's effect based on all students who took algebra in year Y, regardless of grade-level. That is, the instruments do not distinguish students' grade levels so teacher A's effect is identified based on all students whose cohort-specific math-course paths include some positive probability of taking algebra in year Y.
Empirically, I can verify that teachers' grade-level shares do not predict their estimated dropout effects. After estimating the teacher effects from the multivariate probits above, I run a secondstage weighted regression where I regress the estimated teacher effects on school indicator variables and the shares of each teacher's students who are taught in each subject and at each grade level. For example, the grade-level share for the 11 th grade for teacher X is calculated as the total number of 11 th -grade students taught by teacher X divided by the total number of students taught by teacher X. The grade-level shares are all insignificant in this regression with t-statistics ranging from 0.5 to 0.7 in absolute value.
II. Data
I use administrative data linking students and teachers at the classroom level from the San Diego SDUSD is a geographically large district with 16 standard, full-enrollment high schools. 13 However, there is considerable variation in the dropout rate across schools. For example, 4-year derived dropout rates at the school level ranged from less than one percent to over 20 percent in 1999-2000. These across-school differences in the dropout rate make it difficult to argue that teachers at each school at SDUSD are equally concerned with dropouts. That is, teachers at lowdropout-rate schools may not view deterring dropouts as a significant part of their job whereas 12 teachers at high-dropout-rate schools, some of whom may watch one in five students fail to graduate, are unlikely to feel the same.
Because of these differences in dropout environments, teacher quality measured by dropout outcomes is likely to be a more relevant measure at high-dropout-rate schools. 14 With this in mind, I focus my analysis on the four schools that account for the most dropouts at SDUSD. The dropout rate across these four schools ranges from 10 to 20 percent and these schools account for almost two-thirds of all dropouts from the 16 standard high schools at SDUSD. I identify a student as being a part of school X's population if at any time in her schooling career she attended school X. I did not include special-education students in the analysis because these students often do not take typical math courses and are not exposed to the typical sets of math teachers at their schools.
I was unable to estimate the effects of all of the math teachers in the data because there were numerous teachers who taught just a small portion of the student sample. When these teachers were included into the multivariate model the likelihood function did not converge. Instead, I
estimate teacher effects for the ten teachers at each school who taught the largest shares of the student population. These teachers taught between 43 and 59 percent of the math-class semesters taken by students at their respective schools over the course of the data panel (these shares are largely reflective of school size). 15 Within each school, the teacher effects are 13 estimated relative to the average effect of the omitted teachers. 16 Lumping all of the omitted teachers into a single reference group makes an unrealistic homogeneity assumption. However, by ignoring any variation in quality among the groups of omitted teachers, this homogeneity assumption will understate my results. Table 1 summarizes the data from each of the four schools. Note that schools 1, 2 and 3 are particularly disadvantaged (for example, see the shares of students participating in free/reducedprice lunch programs and test-score performance). School 4 is not nearly as disadvantaged as the other three schools based on conventional measures. Nonetheless, the dropout rate at school 4 is non-negligible and because of its size, it still accounts for a sizeable fraction of the total number of dropouts at SDUSD.
III. Results
The idea of an absolute "teacher effect" is inconsequential because every student has a teacher.
The question of interest is whether differences in teacher quality can influence student outcomes.
To answer this question in terms of dropouts, I estimate teacher effects from the model in Section I for 40 teachers at the four schools described in Table 1 . As indicated above, these teacher effects are estimated relative to the average effect of the omitted teachers at each school where the omitted-teacher groups are comprised of the teachers who teach the fewest students.
variation in their classes taught to identify teacher selection. In place of these teachers at their respective schools, I added the teachers who taught the next most students. 16 The omitted teachers will bias the coefficients for the remaining teachers to the extent that the variation in classes taught between the sets of included and omitted teachers are correlated. Because of this, some of the individually estimated teacher coefficients may not be unbiased estimates for the effects of their respective teachers. However, the primary motivation in this analysis is to determine whether differences in teacher quality influence dropout outcomes -that is, to determine whether a distribution of teacher quality exists in terms of dropouts (see Section III). Therefore, teacher effects that are biased only though the omission of other teacher effects will still provide valuable insight as long as they are not systematically biased towards zero.
14 The extent to which the 40 estimated teacher effects differ from the within-school, averageomitted-teacher effects, and each other, will determine the extent to which differences in teacher quality influence dropout outcomes. If teacher quality did not influence dropout outcomes, all of the teacher effects would be statistically indistinguishable from zero.
I estimate the dropout model separately for each school, which means that the analysis evaluates within-school variation in teacher quality. The by-school approach is appealing given the computational demands of the multivariate probit. Furthermore, I reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the non-teacher variables in the models are equal across the four schools.
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The primary implication of focusing on within-school variation in teacher quality is that my results will understate the potential effects of changes in teacher quality on dropout outcomes to the extent that quality varies across schools.
18
Teacher effects are estimated from two different specifications at each school. First, I use a basic probit that ignores any endogeneity between teacher selection and dropout outcomes. Next, I run the multivariate probit described above in which I instrument for teacher selection and estimate teacher effects via simulated maximum likelihood. 19, 20 In each model at each school, I
15 reject the null hypothesis that the included teacher effects are jointly insignificant at the 5-percent level of confidence or better. The null hypothesis that the error terms in the dropout and teacher-selection equations are uncorrelated is rejected at the 1-percent level of confidence at all four schools. For example, parental education, race and gender indicators are generally not significant predictors of dropout outcomes once students' entry-level math courses are controlled for in the models. Finally, in addition to entry-level math courses and some teacher effects (as shown in Tables 3 -6 ), the only other consistently significant predictor of students' dropout outcomes is English-learner status.
are informative, note that they are imperfect because the instruments are predicting multiple endogenous variables and the univariate probits do not take this into account. Second, with regard to instrument validity, Hansen-J overidentification tests performed on the linear analogs to the multivariate probits provide no suggestion that the instruments are invalid. P-values from these tests range from 0.28 to 0.70 across the four schools. However, these tests are again imperfect. Work by Bhattacharya et al. (2006) shows that the linear-probability-model versions of the multivariate probits will perform poorly, particularly in the application here where dropout outcomes are relatively low-probability events. 21 I do not report marginal effects here. Unlike for the teachers, calculating the marginal effects on dropout outcomes for the non-teacher components is cumbersome because each non-teacher component affects dropouts directly and through teacher selection. The results in Table 2 and the corresponding appendix tables are meant only to provide a basic overview of the models.
16 Tables 3 through 6 detail the estimated teacher effects at the four schools. Columns 1 and 2 report coefficient estimates from the basic models and columns 3 and 4 report estimates from the multivariate probits.
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Teachers are ordered by their estimated marginal effects in the multivariate probits. At schools 1 through 4 respectively, 20, 14.8, 13.5 and 9.9 percent of the student samples ultimately drop out of school.
Across the four schools, 13 out of the 40 estimated math-teacher coefficients (or 33 percent) are statistically different from the average effect of the omitted teachers indicating that differences in teacher quality can indeed affect dropout outcomes. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the (marginal) teacher effects imply that they are economically meaningful, ranging from 4.2 to 14.1 percentage points. For example, at school 3, where 13.5 percent of the student sample ultimately drops out of school, five teachers have marginal effects that, relative to the average effect of the omitted teachers, are of a magnitude greater than 5 percentage points. These estimates imply a significant margin by which teacher quality can affect dropout outcomes.
The point estimates for the teacher effects are predominantly negative. Of the 13 statistically significant teacher effects, 12 are negative. For the remaining 27 teacher effects that are statistically insignificant, 21 of 27 have a negative point estimate. If these insignificant teacher effects were all true zeros, the probability of observing 21 of 27 negative point estimates by chance is less than one third of one percent. Overall, the results imply that the teachers who teach the most students at these schools are generally more effective at reducing dropout rates 22 Teachers' marginal effects are straightforward to calculate because teachers enter into the model as independent variables only in the dropout equation. Note that the reported marginal effects are calculated as the average of the marginal effects across students. Standard errors are approximated using the delta method where the explanatory variables are evaluated at their sample averages within each school.
than those that teach the least (recall that the average-omitted-teacher effects are based on the teachers who teach the fewest students). There are numerous potential explanations for this.
One possibility is that although experience has been shown to be only weakly related to teacher performance measured by test-scores, it may be important in deterring dropouts (not surprisingly, the included teachers are more experienced, see Table 8 ). I will consider this explanation in more detail below.
Another possibility is that the results reflect selection. On the one hand, teachers who teach the fewest students at these low-performing schools may do so because they are not offered more classes than absolutely necessary by administrators because administrators knows they are of low quality. This would explain why the teachers who teach the most students perform better than the omitted teachers. It may also be that teachers who teach the most students at these schools select into teaching at these schools precisely because they are effective at deterring dropout outcomes. If this were the case, some of these teachers may actually choose to work with the most disadvantaged students at their schools. The empirical results are consistent with this hypothesis. The changes in the teacher-effect estimates when moving from the endogenous specification to the instrumental variables specification (columns 2 and 4 in the tables above)
suggest that some of the teachers who are best at deterring dropout outcomes may be matched with students who are more likely to drop out (for example, see teachers 1 and 2 at school 2, teachers 1, 2, 3 and 4 at school 3, etc.). Because the multivariate-probit estimates are much noisier than the basic-probit estimates, these changes in the point estimates are merely suggestive. Nonetheless, they could reflect a concerted effort by these teachers (and administrators) to deter dropouts.
IV. Mechanisms
Here I consider how variation in teacher quality might affect dropout outcomes. Specifically, I
look to see if the dropout effects estimated in the previous section can be linked to teachers' effects on student performance measured by grade reports or standardized test scores.
I estimate teacher effects on students' grade reports using the same basic approach as the dropout models where I instrument for teacher-selection with students' class schedules. To maintain consistency with the dropout analysis, I evaluate teachers based on students' grade point averages (GPAs) for their entire high-school careers. Because GPAs are not binary outcomes, I
revert to a linear specification and estimate teacher effects via GMM. I consider three models at each school where the dependent variables for each student are overall GPA in high school, overall math GPA in high school and overall non-math GPA in high school. This latter model is of particular interest because it excludes math teachers' direct effects on GPAs by excluding math grades. GPA data were not available for all students -I use just the fraction of the student sample for which I have grade-report data at each school.
23 Table 7 documents the teacher-effect results from the grade-report models for school 1.
Teachers' dropout effects are reported in column 1 for comparison. Columns 2, 3 and 4 report teachers' GPA effects when the dependent variable is overall GPA, math GPA and non-math GPA, respectively. The results for schools 2, 3 and 4 are reported in Appendix B.
23 The grade-report data are imperfect. In addition to some students not having grades, others only have grades for some classes. I aggregate students GPAs for their entire high-school careers at SDUSD which may somewhat offset the missing-data problems. Beyond that, there is little I can do other than advise the reader to take the data limitations of the grade-report analysis into account when evaluating the results.
Because I non-randomly chose the teachers for whom I estimate dropout effects (recall I chose the teachers who taught the most students over the data panel), these teachers are likely to differ more from the group of omitted teachers than from each other. However, even among the group of 40 teachers that I evaluate here there is a clear negative relationship between teachers' dropout effects and GPA effects (implying a positive "quality" correlation). To evaluate this relationship, I divide each teacher effect in each model by its own standard error and estimate the correlations between the vectors of weighted GPA effects and weighted dropout effects. These correlations between the total-GPA/math-GPA/non-math-GPA effects and the dropout effects are -0.24/-0.08/-0.26. Furthermore, note that for the 13 teachers who have statistically significant dropout effects across the four schools, none have statistically significant GPA effects that would imply a negative quality correlation (i.e., same-signed dropout and GPA effects). In fact, 9 of the 13 have opposite-signed total-GPA effects and 11 of 13 have opposite-signed nonmath-GPA effects (just 4 of which are statistically significant in each case).
The GPA results also alleviate one possible concern with this analysis: that the teachers who are the most "effective" at reducing dropout rates are simply easy teachers who allow students to pass classes that they should perhaps not pass. Given that the correlation between teachers' dropout effects and non-math GPA effects is larger than the correlation between teachers' dropout effects and math-GPA effects, this explanation for the dropout effect seems unlikely.
Furthermore, the difference between these correlations is even more pronounced among the subset of teachers who have statistically significant dropout effects. The correlation between 20 these teachers' non-math-GPA effects and dropout effects is -0. performance that might accompany a student's decision to complete high school.
Finally, note that in analyzing students' GPAs and test scores, teacher effects may be driven by the performance of a different population of students than in the case of dropouts. For example, if a given teacher is particularly effective with disadvantaged students but particularly ineffective with advantaged students, GPA and test-score analyses might indicate that this teacher, overall, is essentially average. However, in the case of dropouts, the advantaged students are not on the dropout margin to begin with so this teacher's dropout effect will be predominantly driven by her effect on disadvantaged students. Put differently, this teacher's advantaged students may underperform on standardized tests but are unlikely to dropout.
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V. Teacher Effectiveness and Resume Characteristics
The analysis thus far shows that individual teachers can have large effects on dropout outcomes.
On the one hand, this information will be useful to policymakers in itself because it presents evidence of an additional dimension along which teacher quality affects student outcomes.
However, it provides little direct guidance to policymakers hoping to identify effective teachers.
In this section, I attempt to link teachers' dropout effects to their observable qualifications, which would allow administrators to more easily identify the teachers who will be effective in deterring dropouts.
If a strong link between teacher qualifications and effectiveness exists, this study will be the first in the recent outcome-based teacher quality literature to find it. Because I measure teacher effectiveness based on dropout outcomes rather than the more conventional measure of student performance, test scores, one could argue that a "qualifications effect" is more likely here. For example, it may be that teacher experience, particularly with disadvantaged students, plays a larger role in improving teacher performance in terms of deterring dropouts than in raising test scores. Further, it is plausible that teachers' own education levels may influence dropout effectiveness more than test-score effectiveness. That is, if secondary-school teachers are limited by their own innate abilities insofar as they can affect student test scores, additional schooling will be of little use. However, if advanced education for teachers can help prepare them for dealing with at-risk students, such training might improve teacher effectiveness as measured by dropout outcomes. Table 8 details the differences between the samples of included and omitted teachers in terms of observable qualifications, including experience. Given that the included teachers were chosen because they taught the most students, it is not surprising that they are more experienced. Also, a much larger share of the included teachers have the basic qualifications that are commonly associated with effective teaching in math. Although Table 8 does not imply causation, it is certainly suggestive.
To estimate the causal effects of teacher qualifications on dropout outcomes, I again use students' class schedules as in the dropout and grade-report analyses. However, here I predict student exposure to teacher qualifications rather than to specific teachers. I consider four teacher qualifications that are commonly associated with teacher quality. First, I look at exposure to math teachers who are inexperienced, where I define inexperienced teachers as those with three years of teaching experience or less. Second, I evaluate the effect of teachers' education levels as measured by whether teachers have master's degrees. Third, I consider two measures that might be associated with math-teacher quality specifically: whether teachers have bachelors' degrees in math and whether teachers are fully authorized to teach math. The latter qualification, the math authorization, requires that teachers complete a set of university courses prescribed by the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing. I do not look at the effect of exposure to fully credentialed teachers because over 94% of teachers at SDUSD are fully credentialed, leaving little variation to identify the effect of exposure to this qualification.
Unlike the teacher-specific analysis, it is unintuitive to model the exposure of students to teacher qualifications as binary. For example, more than half of the teachers across the four schools 23 have math authorizations and almost half have master's degrees. Instead, I consider the effects of the total numbers of "qualified" teachers that teach students as measured by the four criteria described above (or, in the case of teacher experience, the total number of "unqualified" teachers). The outcome of interest here is still the binary dropout outcome; however, the teacher qualifications measures are not binary. Although a simple solution would be to specify the teacher-qualification and dropout equations as linear and run models that are otherwise analogous to the multivariate probit, Bhattacharya et al. (2006) indicates that such an approach will produce estimates of treatment effects that are substantially biased. As an alternative, I
preserve the probit-based approach developed in Section I by re-classifying the teacherqualification measures as binary. Specifically, at each school, I define the number of qualified teachers that teach each student as either "above-average" or "below-average" within that school.
I then use students' class schedules to instrument for exposure to an above-average number of qualified teachers in a 5-equation multivariate probit. 24 The equation of interest is again the dropout equation and there are four teacher-qualification equations. Table 9 details the estimated marginal effects of having been taught by an above-average number of qualified teachers as measured by each of the observable qualifications described above. Table 9 suggests that students who are exposed to sets of more-educated teachers are more likely to graduate. The teacher-education effect is particularly pronounced at schools 3 and 4.
However, with regard to the other teacher qualifications, no clear patterns emerge. Note that 24 Unlike in the teacher-specific multivariate probits, there is no obvious and consistent way to pare down the instrument sets for the teacher-qualifications equations. Therefore, in the models for each school, I select four different but potentially overlapping subsets of the class-schedule instruments and run each qualifications model four times. The results from the four models within each school are virtually identical regardless of which subset of the instruments I use to identify the qualifications effects. This should be expected if the instruments are truly valid given that they are identifying teacher effects from the same underlying source of variation. Because the results are so similar across the four models at each school, there is no clear justification for presenting the results based on one subset of instruments over another so I simply chose one set of results to show for each school in Table 9 .
exposure to more inexperienced teachers seems to reduce dropout rates at school 3, which contradicts both intuition and a substantial body of empirical evidence showing that inexperienced teachers are generally less effective (for example, see Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005) . One explanation for this finding is that the results in Table 9 generally undesirable, highly-qualified teachers who teach at these schools may be the least able as evidenced by their inability to obtain employment at better schools. 25 Given the possibility of negative-selection bias, it is impossible to rule out causal teacher-qualification effects.
Furthermore, to the extent such bias does exist, it strengthens the evidence that teacher education may be a particularly effective tool in reducing dropouts.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper uses a unique approach to identify the effects of teacher quality on students' dropout outcomes. Differences in teacher quality are shown to play an important role in determining these outcomes, implying that improvements in teacher quality can help mitigate the graduationrate crisis faced by many urban school districts across the country (as dubbed by Orfield et al., 2004) . However, the current structure of teacher recruitment and compensation in most school districts, which generally provides little incentive for teachers to teach at disadvantaged schools, has resulted in the consistent failure of urban schools to attract and retain high-quality teachers grade graduated high school. Omitted variables are: Indicator variables for non-EL, non re-designated non-EL, white, male, parental education is high school dropout, 9 th grade math class is pre-algebra and all teachers other than those listed in Table 2 . ***Significant at 1% level of confidence. **Significant at 5% level of confidence. *Significant at 10% level of confidence. Notes: Estimates are relative to the omitted group of teachers as described in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1% level of confidence **Significant at 5% level of confidence *Significant at 10% level of confidence grade graduated high school. In addition, only six students took the algebra-geometry split at school 2 so that control is omitted from the model. Other omitted variables are: Indicator variables for non-EL, non re-designated non-EL, white, male, parental education is high school dropout, 9 th grade math class is pre-algebra and all teachers other than those listed in Table 3 . ***Significant at 1% level of confidence. **Significant at 5% level of confidence. *Significant at 10% level of confidence. grade graduated high school. Omitted variables are: Indicator variables for non-EL, non re-designated non-EL, white, male, parental education is high school dropout, 9 th grade math class is pre-algebra and all teachers other than those listed in Table 4 . ***Significant at 1% level of confidence. **Significant at 5% level of confidence. *Significant at 10% level of confidence. grade graduated high school. Omitted variables are: Indicator variables for non-EL, non re-designated non-EL, white, male, parental education is high school dropout, 9 th grade math class is pre-algebra and all teachers other than those listed in Table 5 . ***Significant at 1% level of confidence. **Significant at 5% level of confidence. *Significant at 10% level of confidence.
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Appendix B Teacher-Effect Estimates from the GPA Analysis for Schools 2, 3 and 4 Notes: Estimates are relative to the omitted group of teachers as described in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1% level of confidence **Significant at 5% level of confidence *Significant at 10% level of confidence Notes: Estimates are relative to the omitted group of teachers as described in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1% level of confidence **Significant at 5% level of confidence *Significant at 10% level of confidence Notes: Estimates are relative to the omitted group of teachers as described in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at 1% level of confidence **Significant at 5% level of confidence *Significant at 10% level of confidence
